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A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Avenali

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

  • Tiziana D'Alfonso

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

  • Claudio Leporelli

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

  • Giorgio Matteucci

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

  • Alberto Nastasi

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

  • Pierfrancesco Reverberi

    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

Abstract

We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that generates an efficient slot allocation, where prices are built on a measure of the best use of each slot in serving end users. Incentive prices are set by considering the structure of the air transport network (and thus interdependencies among slots at different airports) in a given region, and the effect on both quantity and quality of passenger air transport in the region. Therefore, incentive prices should better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with pure market mechanisms (auctions and trading).

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Avenali & Tiziana D'Alfonso & Claudio Leporelli & Giorgio Matteucci & Alberto Nastasi & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2014. "A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-03, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    • Handle: RePEc:aeg:report:2014-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Administered incentive pricing; Market mechanisms;
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