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A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data

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  • Di Cagno, Daniela
  • Galliera, Arianna
  • Güth, Werner
  • Panaccione, Luca

Abstract

Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good in the role of “leader” or “follower”. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level as well as three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the only adjusting player, learns that the other’s independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger than the own one. To approximate the border cases of simultaneous contributing as well as sequential contributions we systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels. Surprisingly, the framing effect becomes stronger with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward adaptation.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Cagno, Daniela & Galliera, Arianna & Güth, Werner & Panaccione, Luca, 2016. "A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 20-38.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:20-38
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrej Angelowski & Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Francesca Marazzi & Luca Panaccione, 2015. "Voluntary Cooperation in Local Public Goods Provision. An Experimental Study," Working Papers CESARE 9/2015, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    2. repec:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:22-:d:143902 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Experiments; Voluntary contribution mechanism;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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