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Two-dimensional information acquisition in social learning

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  • Bobkova, Nina
  • Mass, Helene

Abstract

We analyze a social learning model where the agents' utility depends on a common component and an idiosyncratic component. Each agent splits a learning budget between the two components. We show that information about the common component is fully aggregated if and only if agents do not have to sacrifice learning about their idiosyncratic component in order to learn marginally about the common component. If agents vary in how much they value their idiosyncratic component, then the order of agents can strictly impact how much information is aggregated.

Suggested Citation

  • Bobkova, Nina & Mass, Helene, 2022. "Two-dimensional information acquisition in social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:202:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000412
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105451
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information acquisition; Social learning; Information aggregation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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