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Money, financial stability and efficiency

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  • Allen, Franklin
  • Carletti, Elena
  • Gale, Douglas

Abstract

Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts but in practice contracts are nominal. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. With non-contingent nominal deposit contracts, a decentralized banking system can achieve the first-best efficient allocation if the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money. Price level variations allow full sharing of aggregate risks. An interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In contrast, idiosyncratic (bank-specific) return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone as real transfers are needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Gale, Douglas, 2014. "Money, financial stability and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 100-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:149:y:2014:i:c:p:100-127
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.02.002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank; Commercial banks; Risk sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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