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Sharing information

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  • Rockenbach, Bettina
  • Sadrieh, Abdolkarim

Abstract

Customers write book reviews for Amazon.com and rate stores at BizRate.com. Car drivers call up radio stations to report traffic jams or radar traps. In many cases individuals share their information to the benefit of an unknown group of recipients, even though doing so is costly for the provider. In contrast to a standard public good, providers have no immediate benefit from information public goods. The paper reports the results of an experimental study on information sharing under two payoff conditions (opportunity announcement and hazard warning) and two information conditions (anonymous and identified provider). The experimental results show a substantial degree of information sharing. Information on extreme opportunities and extreme hazards is significantly more often provided than information on moderate prospects. Identification only plays a role in case of extreme opportunities and not in case of hazard warnings.

Suggested Citation

  • Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2012. "Sharing information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 689-698.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:689-698
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoyer, B. & van Straaten, D., 2022. "Anonymity and self-expression in online rating systems—An experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    2. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra & James Tremewan, 2015. "I paid a bribe: Information Sharing and Extortionary Corruption," Working Papers wp2015_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    3. Claudia Keser & Maximilian Späth, 2020. "The Value of Bad Ratings: An Experiment on the Impact of Distortions in Reputation Systems," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-22, CIRANO.
    4. Keser, Claudia & Späth, Maximilian, 2021. "The value of bad ratings: An experiment on the impact of distortions in reputation systems," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    5. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila & Tremewan, James, 2017. "I paid a bribe: An experiment on information sharing and extortionary corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-22.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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