Can more consumers lead to lower profits? A model of multi-product competition
The article analyzes the optimal pricing strategy of duopoly retailers who sell two goods to three consumer segments: two segments that are interested in one good, and one that wants to buy both goods. The analysis suggests that the markup on one of the goods might be negative and that the existence of consumers who buy both goods can either increase or decrease markups. Surprisingly, the addition of the consumers who buy both goods (unchanging the number of the other consumers) might decrease profits, and increasing the number of consumers who buy one good might also reduce profits. This suggests that firms should consider carefully how additional customers might affect the competitive environment and the equilibrium before attempting to attract them to the market.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Glenn Ellison, 2005. "A Model of Add-On Pricing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 585-637.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2006.
"Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 505-540.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2005. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 11755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laibson, David I. & Gabaix, Xavier, 2006. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," Scholarly Articles 4554333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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- Doraszelski, Ulrich & Draganska, Michaela, 2003. "Market Segmentation Strategies of Multiproduct Firms," Research Papers 1827, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Dana Jr. James D., 1993. "The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 288-310, April.
- James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, 1987. "Loss Leader Pricing and Rain Check Policy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 358-374.
- DeGraba, Patrick, 2006. "The loss leader is a turkey: Targeted discounts from multi-product competitors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 613-628, May.
- Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos, 2001. "Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 493-518, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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