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Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions

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  • Hiedemann, Bridget
  • Stern, Steven

Abstract

This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-Term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.
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Suggested Citation

  • Hiedemann, Bridget & Stern, Steven, 1999. "Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 29-57, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:40:y:1999:i:1:p:29-57
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maxim Engers & Steven Stern, 2002. "Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 73-114, February.
    2. Steven Stern, 1995. "Estimating Family Long-Term Care Decisions in the Presence of Endogenous Child Characteristics," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, pages 551-580.
    3. Steven Stern, 1994. "Two Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation Problems and Simulation Method Solutions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 389, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H. & Bernheim, B. Douglas, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Scholarly Articles 3721794, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1067-1096.
    6. Hoerger, Thomas J & Picone, Gabriel A & Sloan, Frank A, 1996. "Public Subsidies, Private Provision of Care and Living Arrangements of the Elderly," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 428-440.
    7. Axel Borsch-Supan & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & John N. Morris, 1988. "The Dynamics of Living Arrangements of the Elderly," NBER Working Papers 2787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
    9. David M. Cutler & Louise Sheiner, 1994. "Policy Options for Long-Term Care," NBER Chapters,in: Studies in the Economics of Aging, pages 395-442 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Douglas Wolf & Beth Soldo, 1988. "Household composition choices of older unmarried women," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), pages 387-403.
    11. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & John N. Morris, 1990. "Why Don't the Elderly Live with Their Children? A New Look," NBER Chapters,in: Issues in the Economics of Aging, pages 149-172 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Stern, Steven, 1994. "Two Dynamic Discrete Choice Estimation Problems and Simulation Method Solutions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 695-702.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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