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Stigler-Olson lobbying behavior in protectionist industries: Evidence from the lobbying power function

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  • Gawande, Kishore

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  • Gawande, Kishore, 1998. "Stigler-Olson lobbying behavior in protectionist industries: Evidence from the lobbying power function," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 477-499, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:35:y:1998:i:4:p:477-499
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    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, September.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February.
    4. David P. Baron, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72.
    5. Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(2), pages 351-366, April.
    6. Oliver Kim & Mark Walker, 1984. "The free rider problem: Experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 3-24, January.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1974. "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 359-365, Autumn.
    8. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuting Gao, 2022. "Lobbying for Trade Liberalization and its Policy Influence," CAEPR Working Papers 2022-006 Classification-D, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
    3. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina, 2023. "Lobbying or Innovation: Who Does What Against Foreign Competition," Working Papers halshs-03970033, HAL.
    4. Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas R., 2014. "Political support for trade policy in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 243-253.
    5. Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Teng Wang, 2011. "Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 323-336, September.
    7. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina, 2023. "Lobbying or Innovation: Who Does What Against Foreign Competition," PSE Working Papers halshs-03970033, HAL.

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