Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly
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- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985.
"Export subsidies and international market share rivalry,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Das, Satya P., 1990. "Foreign lobbying and the political economy of protection," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-179, June.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980.
"Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-87, December.
- J. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1979. "Revenue-Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Working papers 243, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 2000.
"Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 694-705, May.
- Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 2000. "Wealth Constraints, Lobbying and the Efficiency of Public Allocation," Papers 42, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
- Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.
- Gawande, Kishore, 1998. "Stigler-Olson lobbying behavior in protectionist industries: Evidence from the lobbying power function," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 477-499, May.
- Moore, Michael O. & Suranovic, Steven M., 1993. "Lobbying and Cournot-Nash competition : Implications for strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 367-376, November.
- Koichi Kagitani, 2009. "Political Economy Of Strategic Export Policy In A Differentiated Duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 236-252.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
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