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Resolving lawsuits with a decisive oath: An economic analysis

Author

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  • Coşgel, Metin M.
  • Miceli, Thomas J.
  • Özer, Emre

Abstract

The decisive oath is an interesting but little-known element in some legal proceedings, mostly in civil law traditions. It is different from ordinary (testimonial) oaths that are routinely administered to witnesses at trial with the aim of eliciting only truthful testimony, but which are of dubious value in achieving that end. By contrast, a decisive oath can end a lawsuit in cases where the plaintiff has no evidence. We use a simple economic model of litigation to examine the impact of the decisive oath in resolving lawsuits and the effects of religious status on the likelihoods of requesting and taking the oath. To test the implications of the model, we use data from the early nineteenth century Ottoman courts to examine the empirical relationship between the stakes of the case, religious status of defendants, and litigation outcomes. The results show that as the stakes of a case increased: (1) resolution by evidence-based trial or the oath option were both more likely than settlement; (2) the plaintiff was less likely to request an oath from non-religious defendants as the baseline, with an additional effect that was also negative and even greater for religious defendants; and (3) non-religious defendants were more likely to take the oath, with an additional effect that was negative for religious defendants, which offset or reversed the baseline positive effect. Our analysis contributes both to the theoretical literature on the economics of dispute resolution, and to the historical literature on the role of decisive oaths in resolving legal disputes, especially in Islamic societies and civil law traditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Coşgel, Metin M. & Miceli, Thomas J. & Özer, Emre, 2024. "Resolving lawsuits with a decisive oath: An economic analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124003603
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry Nalebuff, 1987. "Credible Pretrial Negotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 198-210, Summer.
    2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    3. Metin M. Coşgel & Boğaç A. Ergene, 2014. "The selection bias in court records: settlement and trial in eighteenth-century Ottoman Kastamonu," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(2), pages 517-534, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decisive oath; Dispute resolution; litigation; Evidence; Lying; Religiosity; Ottoman law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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