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Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses

Author

Listed:
  • Antinyan, Armenak
  • Corazzini, Luca
  • Fišar, Miloš
  • Reggiani, Tommaso

Abstract

There is no consensus in whether monetary losses make individuals more generous or selfish. Utilizing a dictator game (DG), we study the impact of loss framing on altruism and find that dictators’ altruism is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. In a DG in which the dictators share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations are more benevolent than in a setting without a loss and in a DG in which the dictators share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the social norms the loss frames invoke.

Suggested Citation

  • Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & Fišar, Miloš & Reggiani, Tommaso, 2024. "Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 599-612.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:218:y:2024:i:c:p:599-612
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.024
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loss; Framing; Altruism; Dictator game; Experiment; Social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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