We like to see you in the gym—A field experiment on financial incentives for short and long term gym attendance
This paper presents a field experiment to analyze whether financial incentives, conditional on attending the gym, can increase gym attendance of members of an off-campus gym both in the short run (two quarters of a year) and in the long run (the next two quarters of the year). The incentivized subjects received a rebate of approximately 10% of the average membership fee conditional on attending the gym at least once per week in 11 of the 13 weeks of the first quarter of 2010. In the second quarter of 2010 the incentive was repeated, allowing subjects a second chance to earn a rebate. In both quarters they received a rebate of €25 instead of €15 conditional on attending the gym at least twice a week in 11 of the 13 weeks. Gym attendance was recorded both during the intervention period, and during the two quarters after. We compared the conditional incentive to attend the gym with an unconditional incentive where subjects would receive the 10% rebate per quarter merely for staying a member of the gym. The conditional incentive to attend the gym had a positive, yet non-persistent, impact on gym attendance. We conclude that gym attendance can be improved through incentives, but that smarter (non-)financial incentives and nudges need to be explored as well to obtain more persistent improvements in gym attendance.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 134 (2017)
Issue (Month): C ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heather Royer & Mark Stehr & Justin Sydnor, 2015. "Incentives, Commitments, and Habit Formation in Exercise: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Workers at a Fortune-500 Company," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-84, July.
- Dan Acland & Matthew R. Levy, 2015. "Naiveté, Projection Bias, and Habit Formation in Gym Attendance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 146-160, January.
- Dan Acland & Matthew R. Levy, 2015. "Naiveté, projection bias, and habit formation in gym attendance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66147, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, 2009.
"Incentives to Exercise,"
Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 909-931, 05.
- Charness, Gary B & Gneezy, Uri, 2008. "Incentives to Exercise," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3tc3j5x7, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Philip Babcock & Kelly Bedard & Gary Charness & John Hartman & Heather Royer, 2015. "Letting Down The Team? Social Effects Of Team Incentives," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(5), pages 841-870, October.
- Babcock, Philip & Bedard, Kelly & Charness, Gary & Hartman, John & Royer, Heather, 2012. "Letting Down the Team? Social Effects of Team Incentives," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt93n646db, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
- Garon, Jean-Denis & Masse, Alix & Michaud, Pierre-Carl, 2015. "Health club attendance, expectations and self-control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 364-374.
- Jean-Denis Garon & Alix Masse & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2013. "Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-Control," Cahiers de recherche 1317, CIRPEE.
- Jean-Denis Garin & Alix Masse & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2014. "Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-control," CESifo Working Paper Series 4926, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:134:y:2017:i:c:p:388-407. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.