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Force majeure in business relationships

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  • Burkhart, Davide
  • Bode, Christoph

Abstract

The management literature traditionally views ‘force majeure’ in business relationships as the result of exogenous events, that is, the consequence of external unforeseeable and irresistible catastrophes outside of human control. Yet, recent events suggest that companies frequently invoke force majeure for purposes beyond excusing non-performance due to genuine force majeure events. Drawing on expectancy violation theory and employing a sequential empirical research design – including an analysis of force majeure declarations at a focal firm, semi-structured interviews, and an experiment – this study examines the expectations and outcomes associated with force majeure in buyer–supplier relationships. Contrary to the extant literature, our findings suggest that force majeure declarations are, under certain conditions, used as a pretext or strategic tool to address other underlying issues in the business relationship. Our study broadens the understanding of force majeure declarations in business relationships offers significant managerial insights for effectively navigating force majeure-related challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhart, Davide & Bode, Christoph, 2025. "Force majeure in business relationships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:195:y:2025:i:c:s0148296325002322
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2025.115409
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    References listed on IDEAS

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