The impact of reputation on analysts’ conflicts of interest: Hot versus cold markets
During periods of high IPO underpricing, unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks issue fewer strong-buy recommendations while unaffiliated all-star analysts from low reputation banks do not change their level of optimism. In contrast, unaffiliated non-star analysts from both high and low reputation banks issue more strong-buy recommendations. Consistent with the results on analyst optimism, the market reacts more favorably to strong-buy recommendations by unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks than other unaffiliated analysts during high IPO underpricing periods. Finally, we find that unaffiliated non-star analysts from low reputation banks reduce their coverage following an SEO if they are not selected as a part of the managing syndicate. Collectively, our results indicate that during periods of high IPO underpricing unaffiliated analysts face conflicts of interest, but personal-level reputation, and to a lesser extent bank-level reputation, plays a role in reducing this bias.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Irvine, Paul J., 2003. "The incremental impact of analyst initiation of coverage," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 431-451, September.
- Malmendier, Ulrike & Shanthikumar, Devin, 2007. "Are small investors naive about incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 457-489, August.
- Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
- Clarke, Jonathan & Khorana, Ajay & Patel, Ajay & Rau, P. Raghavendra, 2007. "The impact of all-star analyst job changes on their coverage choices and investment banking deal flow," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 713-737, June.
- Carter, Richard B & Manaster, Steven, 1990. " Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1045-67, September.
- Xiaoding Liu & Jay R. Ritter, 2010. "The Economic Consequences of IPO Spinning," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 2024-2059.
- Bhushan, Ravi, 1989. "Firm characteristics and analyst following," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2-3), pages 255-274, July.
- Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, 2003. "The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 1-36, 02.
- Michael T. Cliff & David J. Denis, 2004. "Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2871-2901, December.
- Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, 2004. "Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
- Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, 2008. "Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The 'Bubble Period' Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(1), pages 101-133, January.
- Chan, Louis K. C. & Karceski, Jason & Lakonishok, Josef, 2007. "Analysts' Conflicts of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(04), pages 893-913, December.
- Hao, Qing, 2007. "Laddering in initial public offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 102-122, July.
- Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Joonghyuk Kim & Susan D. Krische & Charles M. C. Lee, 2004. "Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1083-1124, 06.
- Rajan, Raghuram & Servaes, Henri, 1997. " Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 507-29, June.
- Alexander Ljungqvist & Felicia Marston & William J. Wilhelm, 2009. "Scaling the Hierarchy: How and Why Investment Banks Compete for Syndicate Co-management Appointments," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 3977-4007, October.
- Lily Fang & Ayako Yasuda, 2009. "The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(9), pages 3735-3777, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:36:y:2012:i:8:p:2190-2202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.