Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?
Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Falkenheim & George Pennacchi, 2003. "The Cost of Deposit Insurance for Privately Held Banks: A Market Comparable Approach," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 121-148, October.
- Darrell Duffie & Robert Jarrow & Amiyatosh Purnanandam & Wei Yang, 2003. "Market Pricing of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-119, October.
- Gilbert, R. Alton, 1995. "Determinants of Federal Reserve lending to failed banks," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 397-408, December.
- Ben Craig & James Thomson, 2003. "Federal Home Loan Bank Lending to Community Banks: Are Targeted Subsidies Desirable?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 5-28, February.
- Rebel A. Cole & Jeffery W. Gunther, 1995. "FIMS: a new monitoring system for banking institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-15.
- Robert N. Collender & Julie A. Frizell, 2002. "Small Commercial Banks and the Federal Home Loan Bank System," International Regional Science Review, , vol. 25(3), pages 279-303, July.
- Lawrence J. White & W. Scott Frame, 2004.
"Regulating Housing GSEs: Thoughts on Institutional Structure and Authorities,"
04-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Regulating housing GSEs: thoughts on institutional structure and authorities," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 2, pages 87 - 102.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
- Thakor, Anjan V., 1982.
"Toward a theory of bank loan commitments,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 55-83, March.
- Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
- Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
- Beverly J. Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 1-20.
- Wayne Passmore, 2003. "The GSE implicit subsidy and value of government ambiguity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-64, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Rebel Cole & Jeffery Gunther, 1998. "Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 103-117, April.
- James V. Houpt & James A. Embersit, 1991. "A method for evaluating interest rate risk in U.S. commercial banks," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Aug, pages 625-637.
- Grossman, Richard S, 1992. "Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 800-821, September.
- Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, 1996. "The Standard Error of Regressions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 97-114, March.
- David M. Wright & James V. Houpt, 1996. "An analysis of commercial bank exposure to interest rate risk," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 115-128.
- Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
- DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:32:y:2008:i:5:p:680-698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.