Lending with costly enforcement of repayment and potential fraud
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- Jonathan Eaton, 1985. "Lending with Costly Enforcement of Repayment and Potential Fraud," NBER Working Papers 1697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467-467.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
- Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1976. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-666.
- Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1982. "The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1212-1236, December.
- Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
- Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "The real bills doctrine vs. the quantity theory: a reconsideration," Staff Report 64, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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- Joshua Aizenman, 1986. "Country Risk and Incentives Schemes," NBER Working Papers 2031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991.
"The Pure Theory of Country Risk,"
NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Torsten Persson & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1986. "Laws as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time Consistency Problem," NBER Working Papers 2068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "Towards a General Theory of Deep Downturns," NBER Working Papers 21444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diarmid Weir, 2013. "Fiat Money, Individual Rationality and Production," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 573-590, November.
- Joshua Aizenman, 1987. "Country Risk and Contingencies," NBER Working Papers 2236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "Information, Finance, and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 3652, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joshua Aizenman, 1986. "Country Risk, Asymmetric Information and Domestic Policies," NBER Working Papers 1880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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