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Soft budget constraints, bank capital, and the monetary transmission mechanism

  • Toyofuku, Kenta
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    This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy in a situation where soft budget constraint problems prevail in the economy and the bank faces a capital requirement. Under these circumstances, an expansionary monetary policy may increase quantity of bank lending without improving the quality and thus may not stimulate economic activity. On the other hand, in order to solve the problem of soft budget constraint problems and to improve the quality of bank lending, the quantity of bank lending should be decreased. Central authorities need to keep this tradeoff in mind when exercising monetary policy and injecting public funds.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Japan and the World Economy.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 2 (March)
    Pages: 194-216

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:20:y:2008:i:2:p:194-216
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    1. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 1999. "Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 129, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1997. "Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 807-817, April.
    3. Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 1994. "Monetary Policy and Bank Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, pages 221-261 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
    5. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2003. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," NBER Working Papers 9643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    7. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December.
    8. Bolton, Patrick & Freixas, Xavier, 2001. "Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2006. "The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy," 2006 Meeting Papers 512, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Chen, Nan-Kuang & Chu, Hsiao-Lei & Liu, Jin-Tan & Wang, Kuang-Hsien, 2006. "Collateral value, firm borrowing, and forbearance lending: an empirical study of Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-71, January.
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