Investment in transport and communication technology in a Cournot duopoly with trade
We investigate the role of R&D investment in transport and communication (TCRD) in a Cournot duopoly with trade. Our analysis suggests that firms may invest in TCRD at reasonable levels of efficiency of TCRD even when they do not maximize their aggregate payoffs, i.e., when the game is a prisoner`s dilemma. As we consider countries of different size, it appears that for low levels of efficiency of TCRD only small countries invest. Welfare effects suggest that investing in TCRD is superior for the country that understands it. The terns of trade improve as the foreign market gets larger and, in some cases, if the foreign firms invest in TCRD.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Krugman, 1990.
"Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,"
NBER Working Papers
3275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clemenz, Gerhard, 1990. "International R&D competition and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 93-113, February.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983.
"International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert J. Barro, 1988.
"Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,"
NBER Working Papers
2588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October.
- Barro, R.J., 1988. "Government Spending In A Simple Model Of Endogenous Growth," RCER Working Papers 130, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Barro, Robert J., 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth," Scholarly Articles 3451296, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1996.
"Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 485-506, June.
- Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Thisse, J.-F., . "Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1216, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gene M. Grossman (ed.), 1992. "Imperfect Competition and International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570939, March.
- Freund, Caroline L. & Weinhold, Diana, 2004. "The effect of the Internet on international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 171-189, January.
- Martin, Philippe & Rogers, Carol Ann, 1994.
"Industrial Location and Public Infrastructure,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
909, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Brander, James A., 1981.
"Intra-industry trade in identical commodities,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
- L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani & G. Rossini, 2001. "R&D in transport and comunication in a Cournot duopoly," Working Papers 401, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:221-229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.