IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/inecon/v103y2016icp213-233.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions

Author

Listed:
  • Lake, James
  • Yildiz, Halis M.

Abstract

Casual observation reveals a striking phenomenon of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): while Customs Unions (CUs) are only intra-regional, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are inter and intra-regional. Using a farsighted dynamic model, we endogenize the equilibrium path of PTAs among two close countries and one far country. Rising transport costs mitigate the cost of discrimination faced by the far country as a CU non-member and diminish the value of preferential access as a CU member. Thus, sufficiently large transport costs imply that an FTA is the only type of PTA that can induce the far country's participation in PTA formation. Unlike CU formation, FTA formation can induce participation because FTAs provide a flexibility benefit: an FTA member can form further PTAs with non-members but a CU member must do so jointly with all existing members. Hence, in equilibrium, CUs are intra-regional while FTAs are intra- and inter-regional.

Suggested Citation

  • Lake, James & Yildiz, Halis M., 2016. "On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 213-233.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:103:y:2016:i:c:p:213-233
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.09.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199616301076
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 91-123, February.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
    3. Eric W. Bond & Raymond G. Riezman & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2013. "A strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 8, pages 101-127 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Seidmann, Daniel J., 2009. "Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 143-159, September.
    5. Furusawa, Taiji & Konishi, Hideo, 2007. "Free trade networks," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 310-335, July.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    7. Ben Zissimos, 2011. "Why are Trade Agreements Regional?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 32-45, February.
    8. Elie Appelbaum & Mark Melatos, 2012. "How Does Uncertainty Affect the Choice of Trade AgreementsF," Working Papers 2012_1, York University, Department of Economics.
    9. Aghion, Philippe & Antras, Pol & Helpman, Elhanan, 2007. "Negotiating free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, September.
    10. repec:smu:ecowpa:1404 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Facchini, Giovanni & Silva, Peri & Willmann, Gerald, 2013. "The customs union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 136-147.
    12. Ludema, Rodney D., 2002. "Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 329-358, March.
    13. Missios, Paul & Saggi, Kamal & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2016. "External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 105-119.
    14. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2010. "Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 49-62, September.
    15. Soegaard, Christian, 2013. "An Oligopolistic Theory of Regional Trade Agreements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1007, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang & Joshi, Sumit, 2010. "Third-country effects on the formation of free trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 238-248, November.
    17. Caroline L. Freund & John McLaren, 1999. "On the dynamics of trade diversion: evidence from four trade blocs," International Finance Discussion Papers 637, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Antoni Estevadeordal & Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, 2008. "Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization Toward Nonmembers?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1531-1575.
    19. Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2003. "Rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 387-416, August.
    20. Kamal Saggi & Alan Woodland & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2013. "On the Relationship between Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Customs Unions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 63-99, February.
    21. Raymond Riezman, 1999. "Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 751-766, May.
    22. Richardson, Martin, 1993. "Endogenous protection and trade diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 309-324, May.
    23. Konstantine Gatsios & Larry Karp, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 391-397.
    24. Egger, Peter & Larch, Mario, 2008. "Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships: An empirical analysis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 384-399, December.
    25. Melatos, Mark & Woodland, Alan, 2007. "Endogenous trade bloc formation in an asymmetric world," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 901-924, May.
    26. Saggi, Kamal & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2010. "Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 26-37, May.
    27. Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2004. "Economic determinants of free trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 29-63, October.
    28. John McLaren, 2002. "A Theory of Insidious Regionalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 571-608.
    29. Roberts, Mark J & Tybout, James R, 1997. "The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 545-564, September.
    30. Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2009. "Optimal tariffs of preferential trade agreements and the tariff complementarity effect," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 5-17, April.
    31. Giovanni Facchini & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2015. "The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Arrangements: An Empirical Investigation," Discussion Papers 2015-16, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    32. James Lake, 2016. "Why don't more countries form Customs Unions instead of Free Trade Agreements? The role of flexibility," Departmental Working Papers 1601, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    33. Elie Appelbaum & Mark Melatos, 2016. "How Can Uncertainty Affect the Choice of Trade Agreements?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(297), pages 153-172, June.
    34. Ornelas, Emanuel, 2008. "Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 202-224, January.
    35. Rodney D. Ludema, 1991. "International Trade Bargaining And The Most-Favored-Nation Clause," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 1-20, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Moise Nken & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2017. "Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the formation of preferential trade agreements and quest for global free trade," Working Papers 068, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    2. Saggi, Kamal & Wong, Woan Foong & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2017. "Preferential Trade Agreements and Rules of the Multilateral Trading System," MPRA Paper 76330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gnutzmann, Hinnerk; Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik, 2016. "The Silent Success of Customs Unions," Economics Working Papers ECO2016/02, European University Institute.
    4. Hinnerk Gnutzmann & Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, 2016. "The Silent Success of Customs Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5944, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Facchini, Giovanni & Silva, Peri & Willmann, Gerald, 2017. "The political economy of preferential trade agreements: An empirical investigation," Kiel Working Papers 2096, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    6. Gabriel Felbermayr & Feodora Teti & Erdal Yalcin, 2018. "On the Profitability of Trade Deflection and the Need for Rules of Origin," CESifo Working Paper Series 6929, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. repec:eee:forpol:v:90:y:2018:i:c:p:167-179 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Giovanni Facchini & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2015. "The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Arrangements: An Empirical Investigation," Discussion Papers 2015-16, University of Nottingham, GEP.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free Trade Agreement; Customs Union; Flexibility; Coordination; Geography; Farsighted networks;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:103:y:2016:i:c:p:213-233. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.