Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102712
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- Calzolari, Giacomo & Calvano, Emilio & Denicolo, Vincenzo & Pastorello, Sergio, 2021. "Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Artificial intelligence; Q-Learning; Imperfect monitoring; Collusion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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