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Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity

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  • Zheng, Mingli
  • Wang, Chong
  • Li, Chaozheng

Abstract

We consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity-averse monopolist. The monopolist's subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by ϵ-contamination of an additive probability. We find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers, ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract, and the distortion at the bottom is reduced. Other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity, but they get a greater discount.

Suggested Citation

  • Zheng, Mingli & Wang, Chong & Li, Chaozheng, 2015. "Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:40:y:2015:i:c:p:60-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Destan, Cavit Görkem & Yılmaz, Murat, 2020. "Nonlinear pricing under inequity aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 223-244.
    2. Kit Pong Wong, 2020. "Optimal nonlinear pricing by a regret‐averse monopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1156-1161, October.
    3. Christoph Bühren & Fabian Meier & Marco Pleßner, 2023. "Ambiguity aversion: bibliometric analysis and literature review of the last 60 years," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 495-525, June.
    4. Mingli Zheng & Chong Wang & Chaozheng Li, 2016. "Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection When the Insurer Has Ambiguity about the Composition of the Consumers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 179-206, May.
    5. Han, Jun & Weber, Thomas A., 2023. "Price discrimination with robust beliefs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(2), pages 795-809.
    6. Kerkkamp, R.B.O. & van den Heuvel, W. & Wagelmans, A.P.M., 2018. "Balancing Expected and Worst-Case Utility in Contracting Models with Asymmetric Information and Pooling," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 2018-01, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopoly; Nonlinear pricing; Ambiguity aversion; Maxmin utility; Bunching; Optimal control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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