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A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory

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  • Karni, Edi

Abstract

Invoking the parameterized distribution formulation of agency theory, the paper develops axiomatic foundations of the principal's and agent's choice behaviors that are representable by the maximization of the minimum expected utility over action-dependent sets of priors. In the context of this model, the paper also discusses some implications of ambiguity aversion for the design of optimal incentive schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Karni, Edi, 2009. "A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 97-112, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:1-2:p:97-112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1447-1498, November.
    2. Sujoy Mukerji, 2002. "Ambiguity Aversion and Cost-Plus Procurement Contracts," Economics Series Working Papers 112, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-587, May.
    4. Dreze, Jacques H. & Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Moral hazard and conditional preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 159-181, March.
    5. Daniel Ellsberg, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7605, David K. Levine.
    6. Karni, Edi, 2006. "Subjective expected utility theory without states of the world," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 325-342, June.
    7. Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2004. "Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 133-173, October.
    8. F J Anscombe & R J Aumann, 2000. "A Definition of Subjective Probability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7591, David K. Levine.
    9. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:jetheo:v:171:y:2017:i:c:p:64-100 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Qi Liu & Lei Lu & Bo Sun, 2017. "Incentive Contracting Under Ambiguity Aversion," International Finance Discussion Papers 1195, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts," Working Papers 201806, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    4. Zheng, Mingli & Wang, Chong & Li, Chaozheng, 2015. "Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-66.
    5. Eisei Ohtaki & Hiroyuki Ozaki, "undated". "Optimality in a Stochastic OLG Model with Ambiguity," Working Papers e69, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    6. Giraud, Raphaël & Thomas, Lionel, 2017. "Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 64-100.
    7. Philipp Weinschenk, 2010. "Moral Hazard and Ambiguity," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_39, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    8. Robert G. Chambers & Tigran A. Melkonyan, 2010. "Regulatory Policy Design in an Uncertain World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(6), pages 1081-1107, December.

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