A dynamic game of airline network competition: Hub-and-spoke networks and entry deterrence
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- Victor Aguirregabiria & Chun-Yu Ho, 2009. "A Dynamic Game of Airline Network Competition: Hub-and-Spoke Networks and Entry Deterrence," Working Papers tecipa-379, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Philip G. Gayle & Xin Xie, 2018. "Entry Deterrence And Strategic Alliances," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1898-1924, July.
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More about this item
KeywordsDynamic games Airline networks Hub-and-spoke Entry deterrence Supermodularity;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
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