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Codetermination as a strategic advantage?

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  • Kraft, Kornelius

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 543-566

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:3-4:p:543-566
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  1. Smith, Stephen C., 1991. "On the economic rationale for codetermination law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 261-281, December.
  2. Booth, Alison L & Chatterji, Monojit, 1995. "Union Membership and Wage Bargaining When Membership is Not Compulsory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(429), pages 345-60, March.
  3. Martin, Stephen, 1989. "Sunk costs, financial markets, and contestability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1089-1113, July.
  4. Kraft, Kornelius, 1998. "The codetermined firm in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 195-201, November.
  5. Hausman, Jerry A. & Taylor, William E., 1981. "Panel data and unobservable individual effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 155-155, May.
  6. Simon Anderson & Michael Devereux, 1985. "Trade Unions and the Choice of Capital Stock," Working Papers 600, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
  8. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-60, March.
  9. Bughin, J., 1995. "Unions and strategic managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 95-100, January.
  10. Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, 1994. "An Economic Analysis of Works Councils," NBER Working Papers 4918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  12. White, Halbert, 1982. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25, January.
  13. Martin, Stephen, 1988. "The measurement of profitability and the diagnosis of market power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 301-321.
  14. Clarke, Roger & Davies, Stephen & Waterson, Michael, 1984. "The Profitability-Concentration Relation: Market Power or Efficiency?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 435-50, June.
  15. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  16. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Addison, John T. & Schnabel, Claus, 2009. "Worker directors: a German product that didn't export?," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 01/2009, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
  2. John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel, 2009. "Worker Directors: A German Product that Didn’t Export?," Working Papers 09-08, Queen's University Management School.
  3. Dyballa, Katharina & Kraft, Kornelius, 2016. "How Do Labor Representatives Affect Incentive Orientation of Executive Compensation?," IZA Discussion Papers 10153, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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