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Barometric price leadership

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  • Cooper, David J.

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  • Cooper, David J., 1997. "Barometric price leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 301-325, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:15:y:1997:i:3:p:301-325
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
    2. Mailath George J., 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 169-182, February.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
    5. Anderson, Simon, 1987. "Spatial competition and price leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 369-398.
    6. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1994. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 795-819, November.
    7. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    8. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 263-274, May.
    9. Higgins, Richard S. & Shughart, William II & Tollison, Robert D., 1989. "Price leadership with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 423-429, May.
    10. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    11. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-1365, December.
    12. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
    13. Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994. "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers 9409, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    14. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan & Lee, Robert, 1992. "A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 147-156, June.
    15. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1993. "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(3), pages 279-302.
    16. George J. Stigler, 1947. "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55, pages 432-432.
    17. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1990. "Collusive Price Leadership," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 93-111, September.
    18. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.
    2. Thomas Bourveau & Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, 2020. "Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 295-332, May.
    3. Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Raiff, Matthew E., 2008. "Cartel price announcements: The vitamins industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 762-802, May.
    4. Mark Dijkstra & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, 2019. "State-aided Price Coordination in the Dutch Mortgage Market," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-014/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Jul 2019.
    5. Abhik Roy & Jagmohan Raju, 2011. "The influence of demand factors on dynamic competitive pricing strategy: An empirical study," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 259-281, September.
    6. Angela S. Bergantino & Claudia Capozza & Mauro Capurso, 2018. "Pricing strategies: who leads and who follows in the air and rail passenger markets in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(46), pages 4937-4953, October.
    7. Simon Lörtscher & Michael Manz, 2002. "Information and Barometric Prices: An Explanation for Price Stickiness," Diskussionsschriften dp0206, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

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