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Harmonic price targeting

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  • Garcia, Daniel

Abstract

This paper studies third-degree price discrimination in a classical model of price competition with differentiated products. Firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their estimate of their price sensitivity. If the market is fully covered and information is symmetric, more accurate information has a pure redistributive effect, leading to higher profits but lower consumer welfare. If the market is not covered, information always benefit firms but the welfare effects are ambiguous. If information is asymmetric, firms benefit from more information, but less so than in the symmetric case, and total welfare depends on the extent of this asymmetry. I conclude that firms have strong incentives to share information about consumer tastes.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia, Daniel, 2022. "Harmonic price targeting," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:60:y:2022:i:c:s0167624522000233
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100984
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Kenneth S. Corts, 1998. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 306-323, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Groh, Carl-Christian, 2023. "Search, Data, and Market Power," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277701, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price targeting; Privacy; Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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