Two equivalence results for two-person strict games
A game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are the same. We prove that a two-person strict game has at most one pure Nash equilibrium if and only if it is best response equivalent to a strictly competitive game, and that it is best response equivalent to an ordinal potential game if and only if it is best response equivalent to a quasi-supermodular game.
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