Socio-economic issues in forest management in India
India's forest policy regime enacted so far had alienated the common users of their property rights in the name of forest and wildlife conservation. However, poor conservation outcomes have forced planners to reconsider the role of the forest community in resource use and conservation. Presence of a deep-rooted economic, social, cultural and ethical difference between members of Forest Protection Committee (FPC) constrains group behaviour and their capacity to modify regulations governing resource use. This paper studies the forest policy regimes of India in detail and seeks to investigate the influence of emerging socio-economic issues towards formulating a more robust and sustainable future forest policy by selecting the district of Bankura in West Bengal, India, as a study area, where forest protection regime is practiced rigorously for nearly two decades. The exercise reveals that tribal populations are reluctant to be non-workers and prefer to protect the forest by being a stakeholder in the process of Joint Forest Management (JFM). Thus formulating a more egalitarian distributive JFM mechanism for sharing of benefits fairly across the resource users requires cognizance of collective-choice rule used and the type of heterogeneity existing in the community.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Subhrendu K. Pattanayak & Erin O. Sills, 2001. "Do Tropical Forests Provide Natural Insurance? The Microeconomics of Non-Timber Forest Product Collection in the Brazilian Amazon," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(4), pages 595-612.
- Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1997. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: Part I: The Unregulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 451-482, October.
- World Commission on Environment and Development,, 1987. "Our Common Future," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780192820808.
- Naidu, Sirisha C., 2009. "Heterogeneity and Collective Management: Evidence from Common Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 676-686, March.
- Jeff Dayton-Johnson and Pranab Bardhan., 1996.
"Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
C96-071, University of California at Berkeley.
- Jeff Dayton-Johnson & Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 577-602, July.
- Dayton-Johnson, Jeff & Bardhan, Pranab, 1996. "Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt7f9913w9, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Kumar, Sanjay, 2002. "Does "Participation" in Common Pool Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 763-782, May.
- Kant, Shashi, 2000. "A dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-300, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:13:y:2011:i:1:p:55-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.