Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis
We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.
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