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The effects of mutual fund managers' characteristics on their portfolio performance, risk and fees

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  • Golec, Joseph H.

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  • Golec, Joseph H., 1996. "The effects of mutual fund managers' characteristics on their portfolio performance, risk and fees," Financial Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 133-147.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finser:v:5:y:1996:i:2:p:133-147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry, Christopher B & Starks, Laura T, 1984. "Investment Management and Risk Sharing with Multiple Managers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(2), pages 477-491, June.
    2. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-89, March.
    3. Brown, Stephen J, et al, 1992. "Survivorship Bias in Performance Studies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(4), pages 553-580.
    4. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
    5. Susan I. Cohen & Laura T. Starks, 1988. "Estimation Risk and Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(9), pages 1067-1079, September.
    6. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
    7. Black, Fischer, 1986. "Noise," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(3), pages 529-543, July.
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