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To believe or not to believe1

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  • Bhattacharya, Utpal
  • Krishnan, Murugappa

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  • Bhattacharya, Utpal & Krishnan, Murugappa, 1999. "To believe or not to believe1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 69-98, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finmar:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:69-98
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-1223, December.
    3. Krishnan, M & Sankaraguruswamy, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Skewness of Earnings and the Believability Hypothesis : How Does the Financial Market Discount Accounting Earnings Disclosures?," Economics Papers 120, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    4. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    7. Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-958.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    9. Krishnan, Murugappa, 1992. "An equivalence between the Kyle (1985) and the Glosten--Milgrom (1985) models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 333-338, November.
    10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
    11. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    12. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    13. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gideon Saar, 1999. "Price Impact Asymmetry of Block Trades: An Institutional Trading," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-030, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    2. Ronen, Joshua & Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein), 2002. "Incentives for voluntary disclosure," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 349-390, July.
    3. Ronen, Joshua & Yaari, Varda (Lewinstein), 2001. "Incentives for voluntary disclosure," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 309-357, October.
    4. Jordi Caballe, 1991. "Expectativas racionales, competencia perfecta y comportamiento estratégico en los mercados financieros," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 15(1), pages 3-34, January.
    5. Barton, Jan & Mercer, Molly, 2005. "To blame or not to blame: Analysts' reactions to external explanations for poor financial performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 509-533, September.

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