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Is ESG reporting informative to debtholders?— Evidence from a quasi-experiment in China

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  • Yang, Dan
  • Zhao, Zhiyong
  • Wang, Liangliang

Abstract

This paper relies on a quasi-experiment setting given by the differential ESG regulation in Chinese market to explore the attitude of different typed debtholders on corporate ESG reporting. We find enhanced ESG reporting triggered by the regulation is only informative to bondholders while adds no incremental information to banks. Further analysis reveals that bondholders pay close attention to environmental and governance dimensions but not social dimension. This study sheds light on the economic consequences of the recent hit ESG reporting and contributes to the literature on global finance and ESG regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Dan & Zhao, Zhiyong & Wang, Liangliang, 2024. "Is ESG reporting informative to debtholders?— Evidence from a quasi-experiment in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:62:y:2024:i:pa:s1544612324001302
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105100
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    Keywords

    ESG; Cost of debt; Bond issuance; Bank loans; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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