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Modeling OPEC behavior: theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions

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  • Reynolds, Douglas B.

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  • Reynolds, Douglas B., 1999. "Modeling OPEC behavior: theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(15), pages 901-912, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:27:y:1999:i:15:p:901-912
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harry Markowitz, 1952. "The Utility of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60, pages 151-151.
    2. Ezzati, Ali, 1976. "Future OPEC price and production strategies as affected by its capacity to absorb oil revenues," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 107-138, August.
    3. Carol Dahl & Mine Yucel, 1991. "Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer Behavior," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 117-138.
    4. Fiegenbaum, Avi, 1990. "Prospect theory and the risk-return association : An empirical examination in 85 industries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 187-203, October.
    5. S. Gurcan Gulen, 1996. "Is OPEC a Cartel? Evidence from Cointegration and Causality Tests," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 43-57.
    6. Pindyck, Robert S, 1978. "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 238-251, May.
    7. M. A. Adelman, 1986. "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 9-31.
    8. Loderer, Claudio, 1985. " A Test of the OPEC Cartel Hypothesis: 1974-1983," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 991-1006, July.
    9. Gordon Salahor, 1998. "Implications of Output Price Risk and Operating Leverage for the Evaluation of Petroleum Development Projects," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 13-46.
    10. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 279-279.
    11. Adelman, Morris Albert, 1986. "Scarcity and World Oil Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(3), pages 387-397, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hallock, John L. & Tharakan, Pradeep J. & Hall, Charles A.S. & Jefferson, Michael & Wu, Wei, 2004. "Forecasting the limits to the availability and diversity of global conventional oil supply," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1673-1696.
    2. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Why do oil prices jump (or fall)?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 1029-1043, March.
    3. Fuhai Hong & Larry Karp, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements with Endogenous or Exogenous Risk," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(3), pages 365-394.
    4. Reynolds, Douglas B. & Kolodziej, Marek, 2007. "Institutions and the supply of oil: A case study of Russia," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 939-949, February.

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