Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives
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- Jan Horst Keppler, 2017. "Rationales for Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms: Security of Supply Externalities and Asymmetric Investment Incentives," Post-Print hal-01609383, HAL.
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KeywordsElectricity markets; Capacity remuneration mechanisms; VOLL pricing; Investment; Security of supply externalities; Asymmetric investment incentives;
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