Author
Listed:
- Wang, Yue
- Wang, Bangjun
- Cui, Linyu
Abstract
To reveal the dynamic process of multi-agent collaborative energy transition under the coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificate markets, this study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model involving the government (G), coal power enterprises (CPEs), green power enterprises (GPEs), and power grids (PGs). This model is based on a policy-market-agent three-dimensional collaborative analysis framework and the equilibrium strategies of each agent is analyzed. Subsequently, based on the full life-cycle theory, the study explores four periods of system development: the market emergence, policy initiation, synergistic development, and market-driven periods, analyzing the policy focus and market behavior at each period. Finally, numerical simulations are employed to discuss the impact of initial strategy probabilities on system evolution, and sensitivity analysis is conducted across four levels: policy, market, technology, and society. Research findings include: (1) System evolution follows a developmental trajectory from policy-driven initiation to market-driven autonomy, with carbon price and technology costs serving as key parameters influencing this process; (2) Policy instruments can compensate for market incentive gaps in the early transition phase, but precautions must be taken against their potential crowding-out effects on specific market segments; In the mid-to-late stages, policy interventions should gradually yield to market mechanisms; (3) RPS, CET, and TGC exhibit synergistic complementarity, with TGC primarily incentivizing GPEs, while CET and RPS jointly drive the low-carbon transition of CPEs; (4) Regulators should balance oversight costs against performance gains, dynamically adjusting policy intensity and subsidy phase-out schedules. This research offers new insights into stakeholder behavior under policy coordination and market coupling, providing quantitative decision-making support for achieving a smooth transition between effective governments and efficient markets.
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