Selfish routing in public services
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- Kozlowski, Dawid & Worthington, Dave, 2015. "Use of queue modelling in the analysis of elective patient treatment governed by a maximum waiting time policy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 244(1), pages 331-338.
- Meunier, Frédéric & Pradeau, Thomas, 2014. "The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(1), pages 245-256.
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"Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14033, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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- Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.
More about this item
KeywordsGame theory; Queueing theory; Health care; OR in health services;
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