Towards a politico-economic theory of social security
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References listed on IDEAS
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Jessop, Bob, 1977. "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 353-373, December.
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- Hu, Sheng Cheng, 1982. "Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 269-287, June.
- Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
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- Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
- Van Winden, Francesco A A M, 1980. "The Interaction between State and Firms," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 428-452, November.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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