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Castles

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  • Desierto, Desiree A.
  • Koyama, Mark

Abstract

Castles are an iconic element of how we view medieval Europe. Many of these castles were private — the possession of feudal barons, rather than of a central state. From the conventional perspective, the prevalence of private castles prevented the monopolization of violence and is thus a sign of state weakness. Drawing on the insights of (James 1999), we challenge this state-centric perspective. We model the role of castles in the feudal world, in which political order was not maintained by a state but, rather, a coalition of king and barons who each had their own economic and military resources. The most important resource of the baron was the castle, which rendered his holdings less legible to the king and harder to appropriate, thereby increasing his bargaining power relative to the king. This, then, served as a primary check to the king’s abuses and rendered his promises more credible. Castles, then, did not weaken, but rather strengthened, the feudal king’s rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Desierto, Desiree A. & Koyama, Mark, 2026. "Castles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:184:y:2026:i:c:s0014292126000255
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105281
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Desiree A. Desierto & Mark Koyama, 2025. "Feudal political economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 619-658, September.
    3. Blaydes, Lisa & Chaney, Eric, 2013. "The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 16-34, February.
    4. Heldring, Leander & Robinson, James A., 2023. "Problematizing state capacity: the Rwandan case," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 401-425, June.
    5. Chiu Yu Ko & Mark Koyama & Tuan†Hwee Sng, 2018. "Unified China And Divided Europe," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(1), pages 285-327, February.
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    JEL classification:

    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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