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Bayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctions

Author

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  • Kumbhakar, Subal C.
  • Parmeter, Christopher F.
  • Tsionas, Efthymios G.

Abstract

This paper considers Bayesian estimation strategies for first-price auctions within the independent private value paradigm. We develop an ‘optimization’ error approach that allows for estimation of values assuming that observed bids differ from optimal bids. We further augment this approach by allowing systematic over or underbidding by bidders using ideas from the stochastic frontier literature. We perform a simulation study to showcase the appeal of the method and apply the techniques to timber auction data collected in British Columbia. Our results suggest that significant underbidding is present in the timber auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumbhakar, Subal C. & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Tsionas, Efthymios G., 2012. "Bayesian estimation approaches to first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 47-59.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:econom:v:168:y:2012:i:1:p:47-59
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.005
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    2. Ferona, Angeliki & Tsionas, Efthymios G., 2012. "Measurement of excess bidding in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 377-380.
    3. Moriah B. Bostian & Cinzia Daraio & Rolf Fare & Shawna Grosskopf & Maria Grazia Izzo & Luca Leuzzi & Giancarlo Ruocco & William L. Weber, 2018. "Inference for Nonparametric Productivity Networks: A Pseudo-likelihood Approach," DIAG Technical Reports 2018-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
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    5. Aryal, Gaurab & Grundl, Serafin & Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Zhu, Yu, 2018. "Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 204(2), pages 189-206.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Posterior distribution; Bidding strategy; Markov Chain Monte Carlo; Stochastic frontier; Gibbs sampling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General

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