IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v99y2008i1p55-58.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Layoffs and lemons over the business cycle

Author

Listed:
  • Nakamura, Emi

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model in which unemployment arises from a combination of selection and bad luck. During recessions, the proportion of workers who are laid off due to low productivity declines during recessions, diminishing the adverse signaling effect of an unemployment spell. Wage regressions estimated using the Displaced Workers Supplement support this basic prediction of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Nakamura, Emi, 2008. "Layoffs and lemons over the business cycle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 55-58, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:55-58
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(07)00200-5
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
    2. Gray, Jo Anna, 1976. "Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 221-235, April.
    3. Derek Laing, 1994. "Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 375-392.
    4. Núria Rodríguez-Planas, 2014. "Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls, and Unemployment," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 211-258, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    5. Harry Krashinsky, 2002. "Evidence on Adverse Selection and Establishment Size in the Labor Market," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96, October.
    6. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sushant Acharya & Shu Lin Wee, 2020. "Rational Inattention in Hiring Decisions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-40, January.
    2. Richard Freeman, 2011. "New Roles for Unions and Collective Bargaining Post the Implosion of Wall Street Capitalism," Chapters, in: Susan Hayter (ed.), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Gabriel P. Mathy, 2015. "Hysteresis and Persistent Long-Term Unemployment: Lessons from the Great Depression and World War II," Working Papers 2015-02, American University, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/qqo2oivo980taefakkgk0sv9m is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Julien Pascal, 2020. "Search, matching and heterogeneity [Recherche, appariement et hétérogénéité]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03408394, HAL.
    6. Julien Pascal, 2020. "Search, matching and heterogeneity [Recherche, appariement et hétérogénéité]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03408394, HAL.
    7. Julien Pascal, 2020. "Search, matching and heterogeneity," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/qqo2oivo980, Sciences Po.
    8. Carlo Gianelle & Giuseppe Tattara, 2014. "Vacancy chains and the business cycle. Stringing together job-to-job transitions in micro data," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 35(8), pages 1212-1235, October.
    9. Michèle A. Weynandt, 2014. "Selective Firing and Lemons," NRN working papers 2014-05, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    10. Christopher L. House & Jing Zhang, 2012. "Layoffs, Lemons and Temps," NBER Working Papers 17962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Oliver Ruf, 2008. "Effects of Firm Size and Business Cycle on Earning Losses of Displaced Workers," IEW - Working Papers 366, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    12. Stephen M. Kosovich, 2009. "How do firms interpret a job loss? Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1070-1086.
    13. Gabriel P. Mathy, 2018. "Hysteresis and persistent long-term unemployment: the American Beveridge Curve of the Great Depression and World War II," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 12(1), pages 127-152, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Izumi Yokoyama & Takuya Obara, 2017. "Optimal combination of wage cuts and layoffs—the unexpected side effect of a performance-based payment system," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-15, December.
    2. YOKOYAMA, Izumi & 横山, 泉 & OBARA, Takuya & 小原, 拓也, 2015. "Optimal Combination of Wage Cuts and Layoffs: The Unexpected Side Effect of a Performance-based Payment System," Discussion Papers 2015-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Núria Rodríquez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Luojia Hu & Christopher Taber, 2011. "Displacement, Asymmetric Information, and HeterogeneousHuman Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 113-152, January.
    5. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2011. "Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 18, pages 1591-1696, Elsevier.
    6. William J. Carrington & Bruce Fallick, 2017. "Why Do Earnings Fall with Job Displacement?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 688-722, October.
    7. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    8. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-1175, September.
    9. VILHUBERT, Lars, 1999. "Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany," Cahiers de recherche 9905, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    10. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    11. Daniel G. Sullivan & Till von Wachter, 2006. "Mortality, mass-layoffs, and career outcomes: an analysis using administrative data," Working Paper Series WP-06-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    12. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue, 2012. "Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 504-516.
    14. William J. Carrington & Bruce Fallick, 2014. "Why Do Earnings Fall with Job Displacement?," Working Papers (Old Series) 1405, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    15. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
    16. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    17. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 251-334, March.
    18. Erica L. Groshen & Mark E. Schweitzer, 1996. "Macro- and microeconomic consequences of wage rigidity," Working Papers (Old Series) 9607, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    19. Dilger, Alexander & Frick, Bernd & Speckbacher, Gerhard, 1999. "Mitbestimmung als zentrale Frage der Corporate Governance," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 02/1999, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    20. Luojia Hu & Christopher Taber, 2005. "Layoffs, Lemons, Race, and Gender," NBER Working Papers 11481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Michèle A. Weynandt, 2014. "Selective Firing and Lemons," NRN working papers 2014-05, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:1:p:55-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.