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Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions

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  • Campbell, Colin
  • Carare, Octavian
  • McLean, Richard P.

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  • Campbell, Colin & Carare, Octavian & McLean, Richard P., 2005. "Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 95-100, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:1:p:95-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480.
    2. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
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