Practical or legal constraints often restrict auctions to being symmetric (anonymous and nondiscriminatory). We examine when this restriction prevents a seller from achieving his objectives. In an independent private value setting with heterogenous buyers, we characterize the set of incentive compatible and individually rational outcomes that can be implemented via a symmetric auction. We show that symmetric auctions can yield many discriminatory outcomes such as revenue maximization and affirmative action. We also characterize the set of implementable outcomes when individual rationality holds ex-post rather than in expectation. This additional requirement may prevent the seller from maximizing revenue.
|Date of creation:||13 May 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario|
Phone: (416) 978-5283
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
- Susan Athey & Dominic Coey & Jonathan Levin, 2011.
"Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
16851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
- Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996. "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton 96slr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Border, Kim C, 1991. "Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1175-1187, July.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Corns, Allan & Schotter, Andrew, 1996.
"Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions,"
96-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Andrew Schotter & Allan Corns, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March.
- Mallesh Pai & Rakesh Vohra, 2012. "Auction Design with Fairness Concerns: Subsidies vs. Set-Asides," Discussion Papers 1548, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2008.
"The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9001, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1279, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2002.
"Optimal Auction with Resale,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
12664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jacques Robert, 2005. "Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 127-143, 04.
- Alex Gershkov & Jacob Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2012.
"On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation,"
tecipa-445, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, 01.
- Mierendorff, Konrad, 2011. "Asymmetric reduced form Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 41-44, January.
- Jason D. Hartline, 2012. "Approximation in Mechanism Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 330-336, May.
- Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
- Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2011. "Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 218-241, May.
- René Kirkegaard, 2012. "A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2349-2364, 09.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-486. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePEc Maintainer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.