A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lambson Val Eugene, 1994. "Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 444-468, April.
- Lambson, Val Eugene, 1995. "Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-22.
- Beth Allen & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 175-204.
- LAMBSON , Val E., 1995. "Optimal Penal Codes in Stochastic Bertrand Games and Collusion over the Business Cycle," CORE Discussion Papers 1995019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-122, February.
- Requate, Till, 1994. "Repeated Price Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24.
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