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Seasonal Demand and Net Entry

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  • Michael Gmeiner

    (Northwestern University)

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship of seasonality of demand with net entry. Using data on the poured concrete contracting industry from 2007-2012, it is shown that increases in the seasonality of demand, as measured by the ratio of first quarter to annual construction payroll, predict less exit within each county in the time period around the Great Recession. IV estimation uses weather patterns to instrument payroll measures and supports conclusions. It is suggested that in seasonal industries, firms may reach capacity constraints in the high season, in turn reducing competition and reducing exit through increased profits. A model of Bertrand competition with capacity constraints and seasonal demand is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Gmeiner, 2019. "Seasonal Demand and Net Entry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1135-1143.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-19-00199
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2019/Volume39/EB-19-V39-I2-P108.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic exit; seasonal demand; net entry; capacity constraints.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

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