Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Giulia Pavan & Andrea Pozzi & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017.
"Strategic Entry and Potential Competition - Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail,"
EIEF Working Papers Series
1709, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Jun 2017.
- Pavan, Giulia & Pozzi, Andrea & Rovigatti, Gabriele, 2017. "Strategic Entry and Potential Competition: Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail," CEPR Discussion Papers 12113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Innovation in a generalized timing game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 23-33.
- Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Blocking in a timing game with asymmetric players," Working Papers 2018-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsTiming games; Preemption; Dynamic entry;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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