Holdups and holdouts: What do they have in common?
The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. This paper characterizes the commonalties between the two problems and their remedies.
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- Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
- Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
- Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
- Asami, Yasushi & Teraki, Akihiro, 1991. "On sequential negotiation procedures : Optimal negotiation orders and land prices," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 537-556, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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