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Holdups and holdouts: What do they have in common?

Author

Listed:
  • Miceli, Thomas J.
  • Segerson, Kathleen

Abstract

The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. This paper characterizes the commonalties between the two problems and their remedies.

Suggested Citation

  • Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2012. "Holdups and holdouts: What do they have in common?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 330-333.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:330-333
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    3. Asami, Yasushi & Teraki, Akihiro, 1991. "On sequential negotiation procedures : Optimal negotiation orders and land prices," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 537-556, February.
    4. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Miceli, 2014. "The color of law: an economic theory of legal boundaries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 185-209, October.
    2. Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries," Working papers 2013-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli, 2020. "Packaging Deals in the Entertainment Industry: A Bargaining Approach," Working papers 2020-21, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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