Holdups and Holdouts: What do They Have in Common?
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- Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries," Working papers 2013-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsHoldup problem; holdout problem; non-salvageable investments; eminent domain;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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