Time preference and the welfare effects of tie-in sales
This paper shows for B2C tie-in sales with a monopoly or competition in the durable market that tying increases welfare for the likely case that consumers exhibit higher discount rates than firms.
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- David L. Kaserman, 2007. "Efficient Durable Good Pricing And Aftermarket Tie-In Sales," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 533-537, 07.
- Severin Borenstein & Jeffrey MacKie-Mason & Janet Netz, 1996.
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- Severin Borenstein & Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Janet S. Netz, 2000. "Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 157-188, 06.
- Severin Borenstein & Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Janet S. Netz, 2000. "Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 157-188, 06.
- Mandy, David M, 1991. "Competitive Two-Part Tariffs as a Response to Differential Rates of Time Preference," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(231), pages 377-89, August.
- Zhiqi Chen & Thomas Ross & W. Stanbury, 1998. "Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 131-151, April.
- Whinston, Michael D, 1990.
"Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September.
- Ulrich Kamecke, 1998. "Tying Contracts and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(3), pages 531-, September.
- Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
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