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Tying Contracts and Asymmetric Information

Author

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  • Ulrich Kamecke

Abstract

Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US Amercian SCM case.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrich Kamecke, 1998. "Tying Contracts and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(3), pages 531-531, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199809)154:3_531:tcaai_2.0.tx_2-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Alain Egli, 2004. "On Holders, Blades and Other Tie-In Sales," Diskussionsschriften dp0417, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Heubrandner, Florian & Skiera, Bernd, 2010. "Time preference and the welfare effects of tie-in sales," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 314-317, September.
    3. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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