Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality
Without a multiplicative interaction between durability and other quality attributes Swan's (1970) independence result is violated, even with constant marginal costs. Subsequent distortions are aligned when the marginal cost of quality does not increase too much with durability.
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